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We consider a risk-averse firm producing a limited number of goods which can be defective. The
firm must determine its level of production before knowing which goods will be defective. This is the
case for example for a producer of telecommunication satellites. The problem under scrutiny can be
interpreted as a generalization of self protection for more than two states of nature. In our model, the
firm determines jointly its level of production and its demand for insurance. It is shown that, under
reasonable assumptions, the two strategies are complements.
Resumen
Consideramos una empresa aviersa al riesgo que produce un número linitado de bienes que pueden
ser defectuosos. La empresa debe determinar su nivel de producción antes de saber que bienes saldrán
defectuosos. Un ejemplo es el caso de un fabricante de satélites de telecomunicaciones. El problema
que es estudia se puede interpretar como une generalización de auto protección cuando hay más de dos
estados de la naturaleza. En nuestro modelo, la empresa determina simultáneamente su nivel de
producción y su demanda de seguro. Se demuestra que, bajo supuestos razonables, las dos esrategias
son complementarias.Introduction
Consider a firm facing a known demand for a randomly defective product who must decide on the
quantity of goods to produce before knowing how many goods will be defective. The firm can decide
to engage in a reserve goods strategy to modify the distribution of the number of non defective
products. The more the firm produces, the greater is the probability of getting a given number of
successful products. This problem is standard in the operation management literature: it is the
single-period inventory problem under production uncertainty.
We examine the inventory choice for a risk averse firm so that we can study the interactions
between an inventory decision and an insurance decision footnote . Several studies have examined how
demand uncertainty affects production or pricing decisions of a risk averse firm footnote . In all these
studies, the decision variable for the firm cannot affect the distribution of the random variable. We
consider a different problem : the decision variable for the firm directly affects the distribution of the
random variable.
An excess production strategy can be interpreted as a generalization of self protection for more
than two states of nature. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) define self protection as an action or expenditure
that reduces the probability of a loss. Although this definition has a general character, self protection is
usually studied in models with two states of nature. Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) and Bryis and
Schlesinger (1991) have analysed the impact of an increase in risk aversion on the optimal level of self
protection. Boyer and Dionne (1983, 1989) and Chang and Ehrlich (1985) have studied the interaction
between self insurance and self protection with and without an insurance market. All these studies have
considered models with two states of nature and cannot offer predictions about the form of the optimal
insurance contract under self protection. Winter (1991) however proposes to study self protection in a
general model in a moral hazard context. He presents a different generalization of the concept : self
protection refers to an increase in the probability of zero-loss, with no change in the conditional
distribution of the loss.
It is shown that the optimal insurance contract involves a total insurance of losses with a
deductible. The indemnity is independent of the number of reserve goods. On the contrary, the
premium is lower when the number of reserve goods is high because producing more reserve goods
reduces the expected loss in revenue. The analysis of the interactions between the two strategies show
that these strategies are complements rather than substitutes. Under reasonnable assumptions, we
show that the quantity of reserve goods produced will be higher if the firm has insurance. Similarly, the
amount of insurance purchased will be higher if the firm produces reserve goods. Finally, an increase
in the production costs of one of the two strategies causes the insurance demand and the reserve goods
demand to adjust in the same direction.
An interesting application of this model is the space industry footnote . Space firms, generally
facing contracts for a serial production of satellites, are characterized by a high degree of variability in
their revenue. This riskiness arises from possible technical failure during the launch and the in orbit
operation. Production delays being important, it is necessary for firms to determine the number of
satellites to produce before the launching phase and therefore, before knowing which satellites will be
defective. We can observe that the behavior of space industry firms fits the predictions of the model:
they jointly insure the risk of financial loss on the insurance market and produce one or several reserve
satellites.
In section 2, we introduce the notation and the model of reserve goods demand used throughout the
analysis. The optimality condition guaranteeing a positive level of reserve goods is derived and we
propose comparative statics results. The joint use of insurance and reserve goods is investigated in
section 3. The optimal insurance contract and the optimal choice of reserve goods are determined. Insection 4, we investigate the comparative statics properties of the model. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Consider a firm with initial wealth w who produces goods at a unit cost c and resells them at a
price p. The firm faces a known demand and can not sell more than a quantity D of goods. Production
requires delays. We can consider a one period game: the goods are produced during the period and
sold at the end of the period.
The production process may yield defective goods. The quality of a good, i.e. defective or
successful, is known by the firm at the end of the period. The firm must therefore determine its level of
production before knowing which goods will be defective. The firm will at least produce a quantity D
of goods but it can also produce a quantity n of additional goods. These additional goods are called
reserve goods.
The firm is then endowed with the following profit function.
E￿x,n￿ =
E?￿x,n￿ = w + px ? c￿D + n￿ if x † D
E+￿x,n￿ = w + pD ? c￿D + n￿ if x > D
Let denote F￿x,n￿ the cumulative distribution function of x when the production of the firm is D + n.
The firm obtains E?￿x,n￿ with probability Fx￿x,n￿ and obtains the maximum profit
E+￿x,n￿ ﬂ E￿D,n￿ with probability 1 ? F￿D,n￿.
By increasing its level of production, the firm modifies the distribution of the number of successful
goods in the sense of First-Order Stochastic Dominance footnote  (FSD). The probability of getting a
given quantity of successful goods x is higher when the firm uses the reserve goods strategy. The firm
can then decide to produce an important quantity of reserve goods and increase the probability to get
an important number of successful goods or prefer not to engage in a costly production strategy and
face a less favorable successful goods’ distribution. Typically this strategy is a self-protection activity :
by incurring an additional expenditure, the firm reduces the probability of loss on its payoff p￿D ? x￿.
We assume that the firm is risk averse. The utility function U￿.￿ is assumed to be monotonic
increasing, three times continuously differentiable and concave ￿U
v > 0,U
vv † 0￿. The objective of the
firm is as follows :
max
n‡0 E￿U￿E￿x,n￿￿ = X
0
D
U￿E?￿x,n￿￿dF￿x,n￿ + ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿U￿E￿D,n￿￿   #   
where E denotes the expectation operator.
The optimality condition reduces to:




Where Fn￿.,.￿ denote the first derivative of the cumulative distribution function with respect to n.
Note that by definition Fn￿x,n￿ < 0 - x 5 ￿0,D￿.
The first term is the marginal cost in terms of utility of increasing n. The second term is the
marginal benefit in terms of utility from the decrease in the loss probability. This equation characterizes
the optimal number of reserve goods.




Fn￿x,n￿dx = 0. The marginal cost of producting an additional good must equal the decrease
in the loss probability.Assuming that an interior solution exists footnote , we study how the optimal number of reserve
goods is affected by changes in various parameters. We find that, under constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA), an increase in the production cost induces the firm to reduce the demand for reserve goods:
there exists a shift between the additional production and risk shifting. The demand for reserve goods
is unchanged when the initial wealth or the level of demand are modified.
To complete the comparative static findings for the case of DARA or IARA, an additional
assumption is necessary. Let G￿x,n￿ denote the cumulative distribution function of the profit
E￿x,n￿. footnote  It is assumed that there exists t 5 ￿0,D￿ such that Gn￿k,n￿ † 0 -k 5 ￿0,t￿ and
Gn￿k,n￿ ‡ 0 -k 5 ￿t,D￿. This condition, known as the Single Crossing Condition (SC1) footnote ,
supposes that an increase in the level of production modifies the distribution of the profit such that
there is a shift of probability mass from the highest to the lowest values of profit.
Under this assumption, we find that, under DARA, an increase in the production cost reduces the
demand for reserve goods: the marginal cost for risk-shifting increases with c and a wealth effect
reinforces this substitution effect. Under IARA, the two effects are opposite and the final result is
therefore ambigous. If the initial wealth or the level of demand increase, the production of reserve
goods increases (decreases) as the absolute risk aversion decreases (increases). Clearly, the demand
for reserve goods is a normal good (inferior good) for DARA (IARA).
The reserve goods strategy and insurance
We assume now that in addition to the use of the self protection strategy, the firm can insure the
risk. We suppose that insurers are risk-neutral. Against a premium P, the market offers him an
indemnity payment I￿x￿ contingent on the realizations of the loss and the number of reserve
goods footnote . It is assumed that the cost of providing the insurance policy is proportional to the
actuarial value of the policy, i.e. it involves a fixed percentage loading. The premium must at least
cover the expected value of the indemnity payment.




where k is the loading factor. Insurance is unfair in the sense that k > 0. The insurance industry is
assumed to be perfectly competitive so that ( ref: prime ) holds with equality.
The profit of the firm is then given by
E￿x,n￿ =
E?￿x,n￿ = w + px + I￿x￿ ? P ? c￿D + n￿ if x † D
E+￿x,n￿ = w + pD ? P ? c￿D + n￿ if x > D





U￿E?￿x,n￿￿dF￿x,n￿ + ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿E￿D,n￿
 mbox I￿x￿ ‡ 0




  #   
  #   
The maximization problem specifies that the insured will maximize the expected utility E￿U￿ of final
wealth by choosing an optimal indemnity schedule I￿x￿, an optimal premium P, the optimal number of




U￿E?￿x,n￿￿dF￿x,n￿ + ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿E￿D,n￿




  #   
The Kuhn and Tucker conditions reduce to :
U
v￿E?￿x,n￿￿ ? V † 0 - x † D
< 0 ￿ I￿x￿ = 0
  #   
V￿1 + k￿?1 = EUv
P = ￿1 + k￿X
0
D









  #   
Condition ( ref: C1 ) implies that the indemnity payment involves a total insurance of losses
below footnote  a deductible x # > 0, i.e. the indemnity function can be written I￿x￿ = maxÆ0,p￿x # ? x￿￿.
As Raviv (1974) has shown the deductible clause in the insurance payment exists due to two sources :
the nonnegativity constraint on the transfer from the insurer to the insured and the variable insurance
cost.
The firm is then endowed with the following profit function.
E￿x,n￿ =
E?￿x #,n￿ = w + px # ? P ? c￿D + n￿ if x † x #
E?￿x,n￿ = w + px ? P ? c￿D + n￿ if x # < x † D
E+￿D,n￿ = w + pD ? P ? c￿D + n￿ if x > D
Assuming that the loading cost k is zero, we obtain that the firm chooses a total insurance of losses,
i.e x # = D. The firm obtains the same final wealth in all the states of nature, is indifferent toward risk
and therefore interested only in maximizing his expected final wealth.
It is important to note that the indemnity is independent of the quantity of reserve goods produced
whereas the premium is a decreasing function of the reserve goods quantity. The random variable for
the firm is the quantity of non defective goods. The firm does not want to insure each good produced
but a given quantity of goods. The premium only is affected by the excess production since it affects
the successful goods distribution.
Comparative static analysis
In all this section it is assumed that an interior solution to the program exists.
Since our interest focuses on the interaction between the two decisions we first study how one of the
two decision variables reacts to an exogeneous increase of the other decision variable.  prop 
Proof : See appendix.These first results of comparative static analysis indicate that market insurance and reserve goods are
complements in the sense that the availability of one instrument can increase the demand for the
second. This implies that the optimal number of reserve goods is greater in the model with insurance
than in the model without insurance. A non insured firm is more interested in reducing the maximal
loss, which leads to less self protection. This also suggests that if the insurance market makes premium
responsive to the number of reserve goods produced, it can expect an increase in the insurance
demand.
 prop 
Proof : See appendix.
Under CARA, in equilibrium, insurance and reserve goods are complements. If we reasonably
suppose that an increase in the production cost reduces the demand for reserve goods, Proposition 2
implies that insurance demand decreases. It also implies that an increase in the insurance cost reduces
both the demand for insurance and the demand for reserve goods.
Conclusion
This paper analyses a particular strategy : the strategy of producing goods in excess of demand or
reserve goods strategy. It was shown that the optimal insurance contract involves a deductible and the
optimality condition for a positive level of reserve goods was given. The comparative static analysis
indicates that under constant absolute risk aversion and the single-crossing condition reserve goods and
insurance are complement.
This analysis clearly rationalizes the behaviour of space industry firms which jointly insure the risk
of financial loss on the insurance market and produce one or several reserve satellites. If we consider
risk neutral firms, we can observe that the incentive to produce reserve goods still exists contrary to the
incentive to insure the risk as the variable insurance cost is positive. The complementarity of the two
strategies, as previously noted, has an important implication for all these firms. It effectively
encourages insurers, when the number of reserve goods produced can be observable, to make the
premium responsive to these reserve goods. baselineskip = 0.6cm
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting for I￿x￿ = maxÆ0,p￿x # ? x￿￿ in ( ref: C1 )-( ref: C4 ), and integrating ( ref: C4 ) by parts
yields :
U






v￿E?￿x,n￿￿dF￿x,n￿ ++￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿Uv￿E￿D,n￿￿￿
  #   
P = ￿1 + k￿X
0
x #



















  #   
Differentiating equation ( ref: e5 ) with respect to n and x #, where the latter is treated as an
exogeneously determined variable, gives :
0 = ￿pU













































  #   Observe that E￿U
vv￿ ? ￿1 + k￿?1U




Uv￿E?￿x,n￿￿￿A￿E?￿x #,n￿￿ ? A￿E?￿x,n￿￿￿dF￿x,n￿ + ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿￿A￿E?￿x #,n￿￿ ? A￿E￿D,n￿￿￿U
A￿w￿ being the measure of absolute risk aversion, under DARA (IARA) V > ￿<￿0 and V is equal to
zero if the firm exhibits constant absolute risk aversion.








v￿w *￿Fn￿x,n￿dx/Uv￿E?￿x #,n￿￿ > 0.










Note that under CARA, Z must be equal to zero for ( ref: e5 ) to hold with equality. If the single
crossing condition is satisfied, Z † ￿‡￿0 as the absolute risk aversion decreases (increases).
Using the fact that under CARA V = Z = 0, equation ( ref: a6 ) becomes :
￿pU





















v￿E?￿x,n￿￿Fnn￿x,n￿dx is positive by the assumption that an interior
solution exists and pU
vv￿E?￿x #,n￿￿￿cF￿x #,n￿ + pX
0
x #
Fn￿x,n￿dx￿ is negative if the single-crossing
condition is satisfied.
We therefore obtain that an exogeneous increase of the level of the deductible increases the optimal
number of reserve goods,  displaystyle  dn
dx # > 0.
Differentiating equation ( ref: e2 ) with respect to x # and n, where the latter is treated as an
exogeneously determined variable, gives :
0 = ?￿￿1 + k￿p￿U





+ ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿Uvv￿E￿D,n￿￿￿￿￿dx #
+ ￿￿￿1 + k￿?1U
















vv￿E?￿x,n￿￿dF￿x,n￿ + ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿Uvv￿E￿D,n￿￿￿ < 0
and K ﬂ ￿1 + k￿?1 ? F￿x #,n￿
K = E￿U
v￿/U





v￿E?￿x,n￿￿dF￿x,n￿ + ￿1 ? F￿D,n￿￿Uvv￿E￿D,n￿￿￿/U
v￿E?￿x #,n￿￿ > 0
Under CARA equation ( ref: a5 ) becomes :





We therefore obtain that an exogeneous increase of the number of reserve goods increases the optimal
level of the deductible,  displaystyle  dx #
dn > 0.Proof of Proposition 2
When the firm exhibits CARA, the effects of a change in the production cost on the optimal
deductible and the optimal number of reserve goods are given by the two following equations :




vv￿E?￿x,n￿￿Fn￿x,n￿dx￿dn + 0dc = 0
0 = ￿pU
vv￿E?￿x #,n￿￿￿cF￿x #,n￿ + pX
0
x #










  #   
and therefore :
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  #   
See that the denominator of the two equations is the same, then observe that the sign of the two
numerators is positive is sufficient to show that dx #/dc and dn/dc are of the same sign.
If we consider a change in the insurance cost k :




vv￿E?￿x,n￿￿Fn￿x,n￿dx￿dn + E￿Uv￿dk = 0
0 = ￿pU
vv￿E?￿x #,n￿￿￿cF￿x #,n￿ + pX
0
x #
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  #   
dn/dk = ?E￿Uv￿￿pU
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The denominator of equations ( ref: a21 ) and ( ref: a22 ) is equal to the denominator of ( ref: a17 )
and ( ref: a18 ). Observe that the numerator of ( ref: a21 ) and ( ref: a22 ) are positive ends the proof.bibitem Athey, S. (1997), ”Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty: Single Crossing Properties and
Log-Supermodularity”, Mimeo, MIT.
bibitem Baron, D. P. (1971), ”Demand uncertainty in Imperfect Competition”, International
Economic Review, vol. 12, p. 196-208.
bibitem Boyer, M. and G. Dionne (1983), ”Variations in the Probability and Magnitude of Loss”,
Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 16, p. 128-134.
bibitem Boyer, M. and G. Dionne (1989), ”More on Insurance, Protection and Risk”, Canadian
Journal of Economics, vol. 22, p. 202-205.
bibitem Briys, E. and H. Schlesinger (1991), ”Risk Aversion and the Propensities for
Self-Insurance and Self-Protection”, Southern Economic Journal, vol. 57, p. 458-467.
bibitem Butler, A. M. and N. A. Doherty (1991), ”Torts and Orbits: The Allocation of the Costs of
Accidents Involving Spacecraft”, American Economic Review, vol 81, p 46-49.
bibitem Chang, Y.M. and I. Ehrlich (1985), ”Insurance, Protection from Risk and Risk Bearing”,
Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 18, p. 574-587.
bibitem Dahbi, M.B. (1992), ”Estimer les risques spatiaux”, Réalité industrielle, p 47-49.
bibitem Dionne, G. and L. Eeckhoudt (1985), ”Self-Insurance, Self-Protection and Increased Risk
Aversion”, Economics Letters, vol. 17, p. 39-42.
bibitem Doherty, N. A. (1989) , ”Risk-Bearing Contracts for Space Enterprises”, Journal of Risk
and Insurance, vol 56, p 396-414.
bibitem Ehrlich, I. and G. S. Becker (1972), ”Market Insurance, Self Insurance, and Self
Protection”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 80, p. 623-648.
bibitem Leland, H. E. (1972), ”Theory of the Firm Facing Uncertain Demand”, American
Economic Review, vol 62, p 278-291.
bibitem MacMinn, R. (1987), ”Insurance and Corporate Risk Management”, Journal of Risk and
Insurance, vol 54, p 658-677.
bibitem Mayers, D. and C. W. Smith (1982), ”On the corporate Demand for Insurance”, Journal
of Business, vol 55, p 190-205.
bibitem Raviv, A. (1979), ”The Design of an Optimal Insurance Policy”, The Americain Economic
Review, vol. 69, p 84-96.
bibitem Redier, V. (1993), ”L’assurabilité des grands risques : l’exemple du spatial”, L’assurance
française, num 676.
bibitem Winter, R. A. (1991), ”Moral Hazard and Insurance Contracts”, in Dionne, G. (ed),
Contributions to Insurance Economics, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.